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1. Introduction
An intensive debate focuses on the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based
financial systems.  Many authors stress the advantages that banks have over markets in financing
the expansion of existing firms and in promoting the establishment of new firms.  Others,
however, emphasize the comparative merits of markets.
1  Historically, empirical research on the
relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial systems has centered on Germany
and Japan as bank-based systems and the United States and Great Britain as market-based
financial systems.  This work has produced illuminating insights concerning the operation of
financial systems in these countries.  Nevertheless, it is very difficult to draw broad conclusions
about bank-based and market-based financial systems from only four countries.   To ameliorate
this shortcoming, we have compiled a broad cross-country dataset with measures of the degree to
which countries have bank-based or market-based financial systems.
Using this new data, this is the first paper to examine the following questions:
(1) Do industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster in bank-based or
market-based financial systems?
(2) Are new firms more likely to form in a bank-based or market-based financial system?
Thus, this paper concentrates on specific mechanisms through which financial structure
influences economic activity and industrial structure.
This paper empirically assesses the validity of four competing theoretical perspectives
regarding bank-based and market-based financial systems in the process of economic
development.  The bank-based view highlights the positive role of banks in providing external2
finance and funding new firms.  First, a large literature explores the positive role of banks
without suggesting that banks have a comparative advantage over markets in providing external
finance.  Banks may reduce the costs of screening and monitoring firms and managers and
thereby improve resource allocation and corporate control [Diamond 1984; Ramakrishnan and
Thakor 1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986].  Furthermore, banks frequently establish close, long-
term relations with firms and ease cash-flow constraints on existing firm expansion with positive
ramifications on economic growth [Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991].  Similarly, banks are
effective in providing external resources to new firms that require staged financing.  By forming
long-run relationships, banks can credibly commit to making additional funding available as the
project develops [Stulz, 2000]. Thus, in arising to mitigate information and transaction costs,
banks may promote the expansion of existing firms and the creation of new ones.
The bank-based view, however, not only argues that banks are important for easing the
flow of external finance.  The bank-based view also critiques the role of markets and emphasizes
the comparative merits of banks. First, Stiglitz (1985) argues that well-developed markets
quickly reveal new information to all investors.  This reduces the incentives for individual
investors to expend resources researching firms because any new information they uncover is
quickly reflected in stock prices.  Thus, market-based systems may hinder incentives for
acquiring information. Bank-based systems mitigate this problem since banks establish long-run
commitments to firms and reveal less information in public markets [Boot, Greenbaum, and
Thakor 1993].  Furthermore, greater market liquidity makes it easier for shareholders to sell their
shares and cut their ties to firms.  This reduces the incentives for shareholders to expend
                                                                                                                                                            
1 See Allen and Gale (1999), Boot and Thakor (1997), Gerschenkron (1962), Goldsmith (1969), Levine (2000b),
Rajan and Zingales (1999), Stiglitz (1985), and Stulz (2000) for discussion and additional references regarding the
relative merits of bank- and market-based financial systems in fostering economic performance.3
substantial resources exerting corporate control [Shleifer and Vishny, 1986].
2  Thus, greater
market development might hinder external financing and economic growth by reducing the
effectiveness of corporate control.  Also, incestuous relationships frequently flourish between
management and boards of directors, which may induce directors and management to collude
again other shareholders [Allen and Gale, 1999]. Thus, market-based systems may be less
effective than bank-based systems in assessing information about firms and managers and
therefore at providing external finance to firms.
The market-based view stresses the advantages of markets in funding firms and promoting
new, innovative enterprises.  Again, there are two parts to the market-based view: the first part
emphasizes the positive role of markets and the second highlights the comparative advantages of
markets relative to banks.  A big and liquid market aggregates views on new technologies and
displays this in public prices.  Furthermore, in liquid markets, agents that obtain valuable
information can quickly profit by trading in these markets, which in turn stimulates market
participants to acquire information about firms.
3  Stock markets may also stimulate greater
corporate control by facilitating takeovers and making it easier to tie managers’ compensation to
firm performance.  Thus, market-based proponents argue that well-functioning markets stimulate
information acquisition and corporate control that in turn spur the growth of new and existing
firms.
Proponents of the market-based view also emphasize the advantages of market-based
systems relative to bank-based ones.  First, by acquiring inside information about firms, banks
                                                
2 Atomistic shareholders also have incentives to capture the benefits from a takeover by holding on to their shares
instead of tendering them, thus making takeover attempts less profitable and therefore a less useful control device
[Grossman and Hart, 1980]. Also, corporate control through outside takeover threats may face similar limitations
because insiders have greater information than outsiders.
3 Allen and Gale (1999) show that riskier, more innovative industries will tend to find it easier to attract external
resources in market-based financial systems.  These industries might be the more innovative ones.  Allen (1993)4
can extract informational rents from firms [Hellwig, 1991].  The banks’ market power reduces
the incentives of firms to undertake profitable projects since banks extract a large share of the
profits [Rajan, 1992].
 4  By encouraging competition, market-based systems create greater
incentives for entrepreneurship than bank-based systems.  Second, bankers tend to be ineffective
corporate controllers due to their insider status.  In bank-based systems, bankers often hold
equity and vote the shares of other shareholders.  Thus, bankers might collude with managers
against other outside investors and thereby thwart competition and hinder effective corporate
control [Hellwig, 1998; Wenger and Kaserer, 1998].  Third, banks – as debt issuers – have an
inherent bias toward conservative investments, so that bank-based systems stymie innovation and
growth. Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) find evidence of this in
Japan.  Also, in the absence of sound, market price signals, banks might continue financing
established firms with low-return projects [Rajan and Zingales, 1999].  Thus, relative to market-
based systems, bank-based systems may be less likely to funnel external finance to the newest,
most profitable endeavors.
The financial services view argues that the bank-based versus market-based debate is of
second-order importance.  According to this view, both banks and markets arise to ameliorate
information and transactions costs and thereby provide financial services.  In comparing
countries, the first-order issue is the quality and availability of financial services, not whether
banks or markets provide these services.  Furthermore, banks and markets might act as
complements in providing financial services and promoting economic development [Boyd and
                                                                                                                                                            
argues that market-based economies such as the U.S. have been better in developing new and innovative industries
than bank-based economies, such as Germany or Japan.
4  Petersen and Rajan (1995), however, present evidence that small businesses in the U.S. are less credit-constrained
in more concentrated banking markets. Cetorelli and Gamberra (2000) find that financially more dependent
industries grow faster in economies with more concentrated banking sectors.5
Smith 1998; Huybens and Smith 1999].
5  According to the financial services view, it is not bank-
based or market-based systems per se, but rather the overall level of financial development that
stimulates the flow of external funds to worthy firms.
The legal-based view [LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1999b] rejects the
analytical relevance of the bank-based versus market-based debate altogether.  This view instead
argues that countries with legal codes that protect outside investors and legal systems that
enforce those codes will have financial systems that facilitate external finance.  Thus, the legal-
based view predicts that the component of overall financial development defined by the legal
system critically influences the expansion of existing firms and the formation of new ones.
To evaluate the competing predictions of the bank-based, market-based, financial services,
and legal-based views, we use a panel of 42 countries and 36 industries over the 1980s.  As in
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gamberra (2000), we focus on industries and
decompose industrial growth into that part due to the creation of new firms and that part due to
the expansion of existing firms.  Rajan and Zingales (1998, henceforth RZ) show that industries
that are externally dependent – industries that are naturally heavy users of external finance –
grow relatively faster in economies with higher levels of financial development.  Thus, as a first
step, we examine whether externally dependent industries grow faster in market- or bank-based
financial systems, or whether it is the overall level of financial development that enhances the
growth of externally dependent industries.  We also assess whether the legal system plays a
critical role in producing a financial system that fosters the growth of externally dependent firms.
In a second step, we decompose industry growth into the growth of the number of establishments
                                                
5  Also, see Stulz (2000) who notes that stock markets offer an exit option for entrepreneurs and therefore decreases
banks’ market power.  Stock markets also enable an entrepreneur who has obtained bank financing to realize profits
from a successful project by selling it.  The existence of markets increases the return for the entrepreneurs and thus
the incentives to undertake risky, innovative projects. Together, banks and markets work to promote growth.6
and the growth of the average size of establishments.  Thus, we assess whether bank-based or
market-based financial systems are better at fostering new firm formation or existing firm
expansion, or whether it is the overall level of financial development that is critical for the
emergence of new firms and the expansion of existing ones.  Moreover, we also examine
whether the legal system plays the pivotal role in establishing the financial conditions for both
new firm formation and the expansion of old firms.
The results give no support to either the market- or bank-based view. Industries that
depend heavily on external finance do not grow faster in either bank-based or market-based
financial systems.  The results are supportive of the financial-services and the legal-based views.
Industries that depend heavily on external finance grow faster in economies with higher levels of
overall financial development.  Industries that depend heavily on external finance also grow
comparatively faster in economies where legal codes protect the rights of outside investors and
where the legal system effectively enforces those codes.  We then decompose the industry
growth rates into the growth in the number of establishments and the growth in the average size
of establishments.  We again find that there is not a robust relationship between the degree to
which a country has a bank-based or market-based financial system and the rate of new firm
formation or existing firm expansion.  In contrast, overall financial development explains cross-
country variation in the growth in the number of establishments.  Similarly, the legal
environment governing financial contracting helps explain cross-country variation in the growth
in the number of establishments.  Neither overall financial development nor the legal
environment, however, is significantly associated with the growth in the average size of
establishments.  Thus, overall financial development and the legal environment are critically7
important for new firm creation, which is consistent with Schumpeter’s view of the role of the
financial system in fostering creative destruction [King and Levine 1993].
This paper is importantly different from two recent papers on financial structure and
economic growth.  Levine (2000b) shows that financial structure is not a good predictor of
growth in a cross-country growth framework: neither bank-based nor market-based financial
systems are closely associated with economic growth.  He, however, examines Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth.  He does not examine whether financial structure influences new firm
creation, existing firm expansion, or external financing, which is this paper’s focus.
Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2000) use firm-level data and also show that
financial structure is not a robust predictor of economic growth.  Again, however, they do not
examine whether financial structure influences new firm creation or existing firm expansion,
which are two channels highlighted by the theoretical literature discussed above.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric
model that we use to evaluate the comparative ability of the (1) bank-based, (2) market-based,
(3) financial services, and (4) legal-based views to explain industrial expansion and new firm
creation.  Section 3 presents the data.  Section 4 provides and discusses the empirical results.
Section 5 presents sensitivity analyses and section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
Financial intermediaries and markets help overcome market frictions that drive a wedge
between the price of external and internal finance. Lower costs of external finance facilitate firm
growth and new firm formation.  Therefore, industries that are naturally heavy users of external
finance should benefit disproportionately more from greater financial development than
industries that are not naturally heavy users of external finance.8
RZ (1998) find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that industries that rely more
heavily on external finance grow faster in countries with a better-developed financial system.
They use data on a panel of 42 countries and 36 industries over the 1980s.  Furthermore, RZ
show that the effect of financial development on the industrial growth runs mostly through
growth in the number of establishments rather than through growth in the average size of
establishments.  So financial development improves disproportionately the prospects of young
firms in industries that rely heavily on external finance.
Besides confirming the RZ findings with alternative measures of financial development
and alternative instruments to deal with endogeneity, this paper explores whether industries with
a high need of external finance grow faster in economies with bank- or market-based financial
systems.  Furthermore, we assess the financial services and legal-based views.  Specifically, we
study whether (1) the overall level of financial development and (2) the legal codes and
enforcement mechanisms governing financial transactions importantly determine industrial
growth patterns.  Following RZ, we then decompose industry growth into the growth in the
average size of establishments and the growth in the numbers of establishments to evaluate the
importance of the degree to which financial systems are bank-based or market-based, financial
development and its legal determinants for the sources of growth. For conciseness, we use the
term “financial structure” to refer to the degree to which a country’s financial system is bank-
based or market based.  We define our indicators of financial structure in such a way that higher
values imply a more market-based system.
Econometrically, we use the following regression to assess the impact of financial
development and financial structure on industry growth.9
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where Growthi,k is the average annual growth rate of value added, the growth in number of firms
or the growth in average size of firms, in industry k and country i.  Country and Industry are
country and industry dummies, respectively, and Sharei,k is the share of industry k in
manufacturing in country i in 1980.  Externalk is the measure of dependence on external finance
for industry k as measured for a sample of U.S. companies over the period 1980-89.  FDi and FSi
are indicators of financial development and financial structure for country i, respectively.  We
interact the external dependence of an industry (External) with both (a) a measure of overall
financial development (FD) and (b) an index of the degree of market-based versus bank-based,
i.e., an index of financial structure (FS).
6  The dummy variables for industries and countries
correct for country and industry specific characteristics that might determine industry growth
patterns.  We thus isolate the effect that the interaction of external dependence and financial
development/structure has on industry growth rates relative to country and industry means.  By
including the initial share of an industry we control for a convergence effect; we expect
industries with a large share to grow more slowly, and therefore a negative sign on γ .
7
The different hypotheses imply different predictions about the sign and significance of δ 1
and δ 2.  The market-based view predicts that industries that are dependent on external finance
grow faster in economies with market-oriented financial systems and higher levels of financial
development, thus implying δ 1>0 and δ 2>0.  The bank-based view predicts that industries that are
dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with bank-oriented financial systems
                                                
6 We do not include Financial Development or Financial Structure on their own, since we focus on within-country,
across-industry growth rates.
7 This does not correspond exactly to the convergence concept known from cross-country growth regressions. We
include the share in manufacturing rather than the level, since we focus on within-country, across-industry growth
rates. As in RZ, γ  enters significantly negative in most regressions.10
and higher levels of financial development, thus implying δ 1>0 and δ 2<0.  The financial-services
view predicts that industries dependent on external finance grow faster in economies with a
higher level of overall financial development, whereas the financial structure should not matter,
thus implying δ 1>0 and δ 2=0.  The legal-based view predicts that industries dependent on
external finance grow faster in economies that protect the rights of outside investors more
efficiently, whereas financial structure should not matter.  If we replace FDi with indicators of
these legal rights and contract enforcement, this implies δ 1>0 and δ 2=0.
We run both Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) regressions and Two-Stage-Least-Squares
(TSLS) regressions. TSLS regressions allow us to address the issue of endogeneity of
independent variables. Specifically, we want to control for the possible endogeneity of the level
and the structure of financial development.  Whereas the above equation suggests that an
exogenously given level or structure of financial sector activity might interact with the external
dependence of industries to determine industry growth rates, financial markets and institutions
might have arisen due to a given industrial structure.
By using appropriate instruments we can control for simultaneity bias and reverse
causality.  We will use the legal origin and the religious composition of countries as instrumental
variables for the level and structure of financial sector development.  Legal systems with
European origin can be classified into four major legal families [Reynolds and Flores, 1996]: the
English common law and the French, German, and Scandinavian civil law countries.  Most
countries have acquired their legal systems through occupation and colonialism, so that the legal
origin can be regarded as exogenous.  Furthermore, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997, 1998) have shown that the legal origin of a country materially influences its legal
treatment of creditors and shareholders, its accounting standards and the efficiency of contract11
enforcement. Since these regulatory and informational characteristics determine the efficiency of
financial intermediaries and markets, we regard the legal origin of countries as good instruments
for financial development.  LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999a) also show
that the dominant religion of a country influences institutional development.
3. The Data
This section describes the measure of external dependence, the indicators of financial
development and structure and the industrial growth data. The data are for 42 countries and 36
industries. All industries are in manufacturing as in RZ.
3.1. External Dependence
The industry-level data on external dependence are from RZ (1998). The underlying
assumption in RZ – and our work -- is that for technological reasons some industries depend
more heavily on external finance than others. Scale economies, gestation period or intermediate
product intensity might constitute some of these technological reasons. Unfortunately, we can
only observe the actual use of external finance, but not the demand for it.  If financial markets
were relatively frictionless, the actual use of external finance would represent the equilibrium of
supply and demand.  For countries with very well developed financial systems, RZ note that
external funds will be supplied very elastically, so that the actual use of external finance would
primarily reflect the demand for external finance.  Assuming that the variance of the need of
external finance across industries persists across countries we can thus use the actual external
dependence of industries as observed in a country with a very well developed financial system as
a proxy for the “natural” dependence of industries on external finance.  As discussed in RZ, we12
use the United States to compute the natural external dependence and then we confirm our
results using Canadian data to compute the natural external dependence of industries.
The data are from Standard and Poor's Compustat for U.S. firms in 36 industries.  This
database contains only publicly listed firms. A firm's dependence on external finance is defined
as the share of investment that cannot be financed through internal cash flows; or as capital
expenditures minus cash flow from operations divided by capital expenditures. Both numerator
and denominator are averaged over the 1980s to smooth temporal fluctuations. The industry
values are calculated as medians rather than means to thus prevent outliers from dominating the
results. Table 1 lists the external dependence for all 36 industries. The drug industry is the
industry most dependent on external finance, whereas the tobacco industry has no demand for
external finance, i.e. our dependence measure is less than zero.  Table 1 also lists three
alternative measures of external dependence that we will discuss in the section on robustness
tests.13
3.2. Indicators of Financial Development and Structure
3.2.1 Indicators of Financial Development
To test our hypotheses, we need appropriate indicators of the efficiency with which
financial intermediaries and markets reveal information and exert corporate control, and
therefore channel external resources to industries that need them most.  While the perfect
indicators certainly do not exist, the recent literature has developed indicators that proxy
relatively well for financial intermediary and stock market development across countries.  We
use newly constructed data in Beck, Demirgüç -Kunt, and Levine (2000) and Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000) to measure overall financial development.  We also construct new measures of
financial development, isolating private financial intermediaries, and discuss these results in the
sensitivity section below.
Finance-Activity is a measure of the overall activity of the financial intermediaries and
markets.  It is defined as the log of the product of Private Credit, the value of credits by financial
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, and Value Traded, the value of total shares
traded on the stock market exchange divided by GDP.  Private Credit is the most comprehensive
indicator of the activity of financial intermediaries by including both bank and nonbank
intermediaries.  Recent work shows that Private Credit exerts a large, positive, robust influence
on economic growth [Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; and Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000].
Value Traded measures the activity of the stock market trading volume as a share of national
output and thus indicates the degree of liquidity that stock markets provide to economic agents.
 8
                                                
8 Levine and Zervos (1998) point out a potential pitfall of Value Traded. If forward-looking stock markets anticipate
large corporate profits and therefore higher economic growth, this will boost stock prices and therefore boost Value
Traded.  Thus, a positive relationship between Value Traded and growth might reflect a spurious correlation due to
this price effect.  This price effect, however, does not arise in our model, since we focus on within-country, across-
industry growth rates. If markets anticipate higher growth in one industry, the resulting larger value of Value Traded14
Finance-Size is a measure of the overall size of the financial sector and is defined as the
log of the sum of Private Credit and Market Capitalization.  Market Capitalization is defined as
the value of listed shares divided by GDP, and is a measure of the size of stock markets relative
to the economy.   While we include this in our analysis, past work suggests that market
capitalization is not a very good predictor of economic performance (Levine and Zervos 1998).
Finance-Aggregate combines the previous two measures and is thus a conglomerate
indicator of the size and activity of the financial sector.  Specifically, it is the first principal
component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size.
Finance-Dummy isolates countries that have both underdeveloped financial intermediaries
and markets. Specifically, it equals zero if both Private Credit and Value Traded are less than the
sample mean and one otherwise.
3.2.2 Indicators of Financial Structure
We also construct measures of the degree to which each country has a market- or bank-
based financial system.  Since there is not a single accepted definition of financial structure, we
use an assortment of different measures to test the robustness of our results.  We present the
results on four measures of financial structure.  Each of these measures is constructed so that
higher values indicate more market-based financial systems. Table A2 presents the ranking of
countries for the financial structure measures. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) examine the
relationship between financial structure and a variety of economic, legal and regulatory
variables.  Along with many findings, they note that higher income countries tend to have more
market-oriented financial systems.
                                                                                                                                                            
would be the same for all industries in this country.  Moreover, when we use the turnover ratio, which equals value
traded divided by market capitalization, we get the same results.  Turnover does not suffer from this price effect
because stock prices enter into the numerator and denominator.15
Structure-Activity indicates the activity of stock markets relative to the activity of banks
and is defined as the log of the ratio of Value Traded and Bank Credit.  Bank Credit equals the
claims of the banking sector on the private sector as a share of GDP.  Compared to Private
Credit, we exclude claims of nonbank financial intermediaries to thus focus on the commercial
banking sector.
Structure-Size indicates the size of stock markets relative to the size of the banking sector
and is defined as the log of the ratio of Market Capitalization and Bank Credit.
Structure-Aggregate combines the previous two measures and is thus a conglomerate
indicator of the size and activity of stock markets relative to banks.  Specifically, it is the first
principal component of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size.
Structure-Dummy is a simple bivariate classification of market- versus bank-based
financial systems.  Specifically, it equals one if Structure-Aggregate is greater than the sample
median and zero otherwise. An economy can be classified as market-based or bank-based only
relative to the other countries in the sample, since there is no absolute measure of market- or
bank-based financial systems.
These are the most comprehensive measures of financial structure that have been
constructed to date.  Although they do not directly measure the degree to which banks influence
industrial expansion and new firm formation or the ability of markets to stimulate the flow of
external finance, the measures – when taken together – provide a measure of the comparative
role of banks and markets in the economy.  Furthermore, the underlying measures of bank
development and stock market liquidity exert a strong influence on economic growth.
9   Thus, in
terms of economic growth, the basic measures of bank development and stock market liquidity16
are useful measures.  Furthermore, Demirgüç -Kunt and Levine (1999) show that countries with
strong shareholder rights and high accounting standards tend to have more market-based
financial systems.  Thus, key legal and regulatory differences match-up with the measures of
financial structure that we use to assess the relationship between industrial performance and
degree to which countries are bank-based or market-based.
3.2.3 The Legal Environment
We use three indicators of the rights of outside investors and the degree to which these
rights are enforced. These data are from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
Creditor is an index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect the
claims of secured creditors in the case of reorganization or liquidation of a company.  It ranges
from zero to four and is the sum of four dummy variables that indicate whether (i) the
reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay on assets, thereby not preventing
secured creditors from taking possession of loan collateral, (ii) secured creditors are ranked first
in the case of liquidation, (iii) management does not stay in charge of the firm during
reorganization, thereby enhancing creditors’ power, and (iv) management needs creditors’
consent when filing for reorganization.  In economies with higher values of Creditor, outside
investors have more rights relative to the management and other stakeholders, and should
therefore be more willing to provide the external resources that industries need.
Anti-Director is an index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect
minority shareholder rights.  It ranges from zero to six and is the sum of six dummy variables
that indicate whether (i) shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (ii)
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting,
                                                                                                                                                            
9 For evidence on the impact of financial intermediation on growth, see, for example, Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000).  For evidence on the impact of stock markets on growth, see Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rousseau and17
(iii) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is
allowed, (iv) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place, (v) the minimum percentage of share
capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than
or equal to 10 percent, and (vi) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a
shareholders’ vote. In economies with higher values of Anti-Director, minority shareholder are
better protected against expropriation by management and large shareholders and should
therefore be more willing to provide the external resources that industries need.
10
Rule of Law is an assessment of the law and order tradition of a country that ranges from
10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition.  This measure was
constructed by ICRG and is an average over the period 1982-1990.  In countries with a higher
law and order tradition, outside investors can more easily enforce their claims and rights and
should therefore be more willing to provide external finance.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and the correlations for our measures of financial
development and structure.  There is a large variance in the measures of both financial
development and structure.  Japan shows the highest value for Finance-Activity and Bangladesh
the lowest.  Structure-Activity classifies Great Britain as the most market-based system and
Bangladesh as the most bank-based system.  We also note that most indicators of financial
development are positively correlated with the indicators of financial structure, i.e. financially
more developed economies tend to have market-based systems.  Table A1 lists all measures of
financial development, structure and the legal indicators for the countries included in our study.
                                                                                                                                                            
Wachtel (2000).
10 Instead of using the sum of the different creditor and minority shareholder rights, we also used principal
component indicators, and obtained the same results.18
3.3. Industry Growth Rates
Our dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of value added. We use the data
obtained by RZ from the Industrial Statistics Yearbook database put together by the United
Nations Statistical Division (1993).  We also use a decomposition of the industry growth rate.
Specifically, we consider the growth in the number of establishments and the average size of
establishments.
 11
Table 3 lists descriptive statistics and correlations between the three different dependent
variables.  We note that the growth rate in the number of establishments is negatively correlated
with the growth rate in the average size of firms. This suggests that industries grow either due to
the entry of new firms or due to the expansion of existing firms, but not both.
4. The Results
4.1 Financial Development and Industry Growth
We first present the results of regressions of industry growth rates on the interaction of
financial development and external dependence. Our regressions differ from those presented by
RZ to the extent that (i) our measures of financial development capture both the effects of
financial intermediary and stock market development, and (ii) we include the indicators of
financial sector development in logs instead of levels to allow for the nonlinearity in the
relationship between financial development and growth illustrated by Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000).  To make our results comparable to those in RZ, we include the “Differential in real
                                                
11 There are no cross-country data available on firms.  An establishment is defined as a “unit which engages, under a
single ownership or control, in one, or predominantly one, kind of activity at a single location.”  The growth in the
number of establishments (average size of establishment) is defined as the log difference of the number of19
growth rate”. This indicates how much faster the industry at the 75th percentile of external
dependence (Machinery) would have grown compared to the industry at the 25th percentile
(Beverages), if Machinery had been located in the country at the 75th percentile of the respective
measure of financial development instead of the country at the 25th
 percentile.  Since U.S data
are used to calculate our measure of external dependence, the U.S. is dropped from all
regressions.
The results in Table 4 indicate a significantly positive interaction of external dependence
and overall financial development on industry growth. The coefficients on the interaction terms
of all our indicators of financial sector development and external dependence are significantly
positive at the five- percent level.  We start with the top panel and Finance-Activity. The results
of the OLS regressions indicate that, for a given industry with a positive external dependence
ratio, a higher level of Finance-Activity results in a higher growth rate of this industry. To
illustrate the significance of this result, consider the growth differential of 2.3 percent. The
coefficient estimate thus predicts that Machinery would grow 2.3 percentage points faster than
Beverages, if it were located in Malaysia rather than to Greece.
12 The results in columns 2
through 4 indicate that this result is robust to the use of other measures of financial sector
development.
The results of the instrumental variable regressions confirm that the link between external
dependence, financial development and industry growth is not due to simultaneity bias or reverse
causality (Table 4, bottom panel). We report the regression results using TSLS and the legal
origin dummies as instruments for financial sector development.  The interaction terms with all
                                                                                                                                                            
establishments (value added in the industry divided by number of establishments) at the beginning and the end of the
period.
12 The growth differential is calculated as follows: 1.553*0.368 (External dependence of machinery minus external
dependence of beverages)*3.962(Finance-Activity in Malaysia minus Finance-Activity in Greece).20
three indicators of financial development show coefficients that are significant at the ten percent
level.  The coefficients, however, are of smaller size than in the OLS regressions.
13  The growth
differentials of the TSLS regressions are also more in line with the results obtained by RZ.
These results therefore indicate that better-developed financial intermediaries and markets
ameliorate market frictions and thereby promote the growth of industries that rely more heavily
on external finance.
4.2 Financial Structure and Industry Growth
Thus far, the results confirm those in RZ.  Industries that depend heavily on external
finance grow faster in economies with higher levels of financial development.  We will now turn
to the question of whether a specific structure of the financial system – bank-based or market-
based -- enhances growth of these industries.
The results in Table 5 indicate that the financial structure does not have an independent
impact on industrial growth patterns across countries.  Although the interaction terms with all
measures of financial structure show coefficients that are significant at the five- percent level in
the OLS regressions, these results are not confirmed by the instrumental variable regressions.
The results in Table 6 support the financial services view and reject the bank-based and
market-based views.  Specifically, we find that when controlling for the level of financial
development, the interaction of external dependence and financial structure does not have a
significant impact on industrial growth patterns across countries.
14  Whereas the interaction
terms with all indicators of financial development are significant at the five- percent level, none
of the interaction terms with our financial structure measure is significant.  These results indicate
                                                
13 Since Finance-Dummy is a binary variable and because of the findings reported below, we do not attempt to
instrument for Finance-Dummy using a probit regression in the first stage.
14 In the following we will only present the TSLS results.  The OLS regressions yield similar results.21
strong evidence in favor of the financial services view and against both the bank-based and
market-based view.
15
The results in Table 7 provide support for the legal-based approach. To evaluate the legal-
based approach we replace our indicators of financial development with Creditor, Anti-director
and Rule of Law.
16  To test for the joint significance of these legal variables, we include an F-test
of the three interaction terms.  While none of the interaction terms of our financial structure
variables is significant, the interaction terms of the three legal variables are jointly significant.
The p-values for the individual interaction terms indicate that it is especially the enforcement of
investor rights that explains industrial growth patterns across countries.
4.3 Financial Structure and the Sources of Industry Growth
We now decompose the industry growth rates into two components: the growth in the
number of establishments and the growth in the average size of establishments. The creation of
new establishments is more likely to depend on external funds than the expansion of existing
establishments, which can be financed with internal resources.  The decomposition of industry
growth therefore provides both a robustness test of the previous results and a more detailed
exploration of the mechanisms through which financial development and financial structure
influence industrial growth patterns across countries.
                                                
15 While Levine and Zervos (1998) find evidence that stock markets and banks enhance economic growth through
different channels, Levine (2000b) and this paper test the hypothesis that the composition of the financial sector
matters for economic growth. These two questions are complementary and not conflicting. For instance, if we had
found a statistically significant parameter on financial structure, δ 2 (significantly positive or negative), this would
not have invalidated the results obtained by Levine and Zervos (1998).  This results would have indicated that
market-based systems (or bank-based systems) are more conducive to the growth of financially dependent industries
and the emergence of new firms.  This result, however, would not necessarily imply that banks (or markets) do not
have a positive impact on economic growth.22
Again, the results in Table 8 support the financial services view and contradict both the
bank-based and market-based views.  The results indicate that overall financial development
increases the growth in the number of establishments in industries that are dependent on external
finance.  However, distinguishing by whether a country is bank-based or market-based does not
help explain the emergence of new establishments. The results in Table 9 indicate that neither
financial development nor structure helps explain the growth rate of the average size of
establishments across countries.
17 This is consistent with findings by RZ that firms depend on
external finance during their early years and less during later years.
Table 10 provides evidence consistent with the legal-based view.  The legal determinants
of financial development can explain industry patterns in the growth in the number of
establishments, but not in the growth in the average size of establishments across countries.  The
interaction terms with financial structure are again insignificant.
In sum, these results indicate that the overall level of financial development and its legal
determinants help externally dependent industries grow faster by enabling the start-up of new
firms and not through the expansion of existing ones.  This is consistent with the Schumpeterian
view that financial development enhances economic growth by allowing new firms and projects
to develop.  These results are also consistent with previous studies that show that financial
development enhances economic growth through a better resource allocation and not through
capital accumulation [Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000].
                                                                                                                                                            
16 Alternatively, we could use these legal indicators as instruments to thus extract the exogenous component of
financial development explained by these legal rights and their enforcement.  The results are similar to the ones
reported here.




This section assesses the robustness of the results to alternative measures of financial
structure, financial development, and external dependence.  First, recognizing that there is not a
universally accepted definition of bank-based versus market-based, we decided to isolate those
countries with extremely bank-based or market-based systems.  Perhaps, very “unbalanced”
financial systems are robustly linked with industrial performance, even though continuous
measures used thus far are not.  We construct three additional variables.  Unbalanced-Bank
equals one if Bank Credit is greater than the sample median and Value Traded is less than the
sample median, and zero otherwise.
19  Unbalanced-Market equals one if Value Traded is greater
than the sample median and Bank Credit less than the sample median, and zero otherwise.
20
Finally, Unbalanced equals one if either Unbalanced Bank or Unbalanced Market equals one,
and zero otherwise.  The results indicate that classifying countries as having unbalanced financial
systems does not help explain industrial growth patterns across countries.
To assess further the robustness of our results, we also constructed measures of financial
development and structure that only include the assets privately-owned banks and therefore
exclude the assets of state-owned banks.  Our findings are robust to the use of credit to the
private sector by privately-owned financial institutions. Using recently compiled data by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) on the public share in the commercial banking
sector, we construct two new measures of (1) credit to the private sector by privately owned
deposit money banks and (2) credit to the private sector by privately owned financial
                                                
18 These results are available on request in Appendix B.
19 Austria, Chile, Denmark, Finland, and Portugal are classified as having unbalanced bank-based systems.
20 Australia, Brazil, India, New Zealand and Sweden are classified as having unbalanced market-based systems.24
intermediaries.
21 We then recalculate all our indicators of overall financial development and
financial structure using these measures to check the robustness of our previous findings.
22
These new measures confirm our earlier findings: Neither bank- nor market-based systems have
a robust link with the growth patterns of externally dependent industries, new firm creation, or
existing firm expansion. The results strongly support the legal-based view.   In sum, these
additional measures of financial development and structure do not alter the paper’s findings.
We also use two measures of financial structure proposed by Demirgüç-Kunt and
Maksimovic (2000).  Specifically, we regress Value Traded on Rule of Law, the British legal
origin dummy, the inflation rate and Anti-Director.
23  The residuals of this regression reflect the
component of stock market development not predicted by the legal and macroeconomic
environment.  Similarly, we regress Bank Credit on Rule of Law, the British legal origin dummy,
the inflation rate and Creditor.  Positive residuals from these two regressions, which we call
Excess-Market and Excess-Bank, indicate stock market and banking sector development that
goes beyond the predicted development.  We then include interaction terms of external
dependence with both residual series in our regressions.  A positive coefficient on either
interaction term would indicate that externally dependent industries grow faster in countries in
which the stock market or banks are larger than predicted by the legal or macroeconomic
environment.  These alternative measures of financial structure do enter significantly and
therefore provide additional support for the legal-based view.
                                                
21 Specifically, we multiply the measures discussed above by one minus the share of publicly owned commercial
banks. We use the average of the government ownership in 1995 and pre-privatization. Both measures are
constructed as the percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned by the government divided by
the total assets of the banking sector.  See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) for details. The
correlations between our two new measures and the original ones are 88% and 92%, respectively.
22 Although the public share refers only to commercial banks, we assume that the nonbank financial sector presents a
similar ownership structure for each country.
23 Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2000) show that inflation tends to reduce stock market liquidity and banking sector
activity.25
The RZ data set contains three alternative measures of external dependence that allow us to
test the sensitivity of our results. The three alternative measures of external dependence are
significantly correlated with our principal measure of external dependence at the one-percent
level, with correlation coefficients being at least 60%.  We first use the dependence on external
finance of firms that went public during the previous ten years. RZ show that the demand for
external finance is highest during the early years of a company. Using a sample of young firms to
calculate the dependence on external finance might therefore give a more appropriate picture of
the need for external finance.  Using the external dependence of young firms does not alter our
main result: financial structure does not robustly explain industrial growth patterns, new firm
formation, or old firm expansion.  When using young firms to define external dependence, there
are some specifications in which overall financial development enters insignificantly.  However,
using the external dependence of young firms lends particularly strong support to the legal-based
view of finance and growth.
Our results are also robust to using a measure of external dependence that is calculated for
the period 1970-79.  RZ suggest that if countries other than the U.S. use older technologies, the
external dependence as measured over the 80s might not reflect well the needs for external
finance in other countries, especially developing countries. We therefore rerun the regressions
using the external dependence measured over the 70s. Since the U.S. was also “more” bank-
based in the 70s than in 80s, using this historic measure of external dependence has another
advantage.  It allows us to test the sensitivity of our results to a bias that might have been
introduced by using the external dependence of industries measured for a sample of firms in a
market-based economy. Our results are similar to the ones obtained with our principal measure
of external finance, as measured over the 80s.  There is not a robust link between financial26
structure and industrial growth patterns, but overall financial development and the component of
overall financial development explained by the legal environment help explain industrial growth
patterns, especially the formation of new firms.
Finally, our previous results concerning financial development and financial structure are
not due to peculiar characteristics of industries in the U.S.  We use the external dependence as
calculated for a sample of Canadian firms, which RZ note is the only other country for which
firm-level flow of funds are available. We confirm our results concerning financial structure.
However, using the Canadian data, we cannot confirm the results concerning the legal-based
view and the results on the financial services view are weakened.   These results might be partly
explained by the fact that we have data for only 27 industries in the Canadian sample, whereas
there are at least 36 industries in the text specification.  Furthermore, the sample size drops from
1222 to 702.  Thus, with some qualifications, the robustness checks confirm the text’s main
conclusions: (1) industries that are heavily dependent on external finance do not grow faster in
bank-based or market-based financial system, (2) externally dependent industries do, however,
tend to grow faster in countries with better-developed financial systems and especially in
economies that efficiently project the legal rights of outside investors, and (3) overall financial
development and the legal protection of investors stimulates industry growth primarily by
facilitating new firm formation.
6. Conclusions
This paper examined the following questions: Do industries that depend heavily on
external finance grow faster in bank-based or market-based systems? Are new firms more likely
to form in a bank-based or market-based financial system? Alternatively, is it the overall level of27
financial development or the legal system that explains industrial growth patterns and the
emergence of new firms across countries?
The results do not provide support for either the bank-based or the market-based view.
Measuring whether a country is bank-based or market-based does not help explain industrial
growth patterns.  The results do indicate, however, that industries that are heavy users of external
finance grow faster in countries with higher overall levels of financial development and in
countries that rigorously protect the rights of outside investors.  Moreover, the findings show that
the overall level of financial development along with strong creditor rights, shareholder rights,
and contract enforcement mechanisms foster new firm formation.  Together, these findings
provide support for the financial-services and legal-based views.28
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Financial Intermediation, 1995, 4, 158-87.Table 1: Measures of External Dependence Across Industries
  All U.S.  Young U.S. All U.S.  Canadian
ISIC code Industrial Sector companies, 80s companies, 80s companies, 70s  companies, 80s
314 Tobacco -0.45 -0.13 -0.59
361 Pottery -0.15 -0.41 -0.45
323 Leather -0.14 -1.53 -0.04
3211 Spinning -0.09 0.05
324 Footwear -0.08 0.65 -0.26
372 Nonferrous metal 0.01 0.46 0.19 -0.09
322 Apparel 0.03 0.27 0.03
353 Petroleum refineries 0.04 0.85 0.06 -0.01
369 Nonmetal mineral products 0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.12
313 Beverages 0.08 0.63 -0.06 0.59
371 Iron and steel 0.09 0.26 -0.01 0.22
311 Food products 0.14 0.66 0.06 0.11
3411 Pulp, paper 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.15
3513 Synthetic resins 0.16 0.79 0.03 -0.24
341 Paper and paper products 0.18 0.57 -0.01 -0.15
342 Printing and publishing 0.20 0.60 -0.01 0.38
352 Other chemicals 0.22 1.35 -0.07 -0.80
355 Rubber products 0.23 0.50 0.07
332 Furniture 0.24 0.68 0.16
381 Metal products 0.24 0.87 0.17 0.61
3511 Basic industrial goods excl. fertilizers 0.25 0.79 0.21 0.38
331 Wood products 0.28 0.34 0.28 0.30
384 Transportation equipment 0.31 0.58 0.23 0.79
354 Petroleum and coal products 0.33 -0.26 -0.21
3843 Motor vehicles 0.39 0.76 0.13 0.29
321 Textile 0.40 0.66 -0.04 0.57
382 Machinery 0.45 0.75 0.16 0.34
3841 Ships 0.46 1.05 0.15
390 Other industries 0.47 0.80 0.12 0.69
362 Glass 0.53 1.52 0.07 0.56
383 Electric machinery 0.77 1.22 0.26 0.75
385 Professional and scientific goods 0.96 1.63 0.40 0.51
3832 Radios 1.04 1.35 0.41 1.09
3825 Office and computing products 1.06 1.16 0.54 1.19
356 Plastic products 1.14 1.14 0.48
3522 Drugs 1.49 2.06 0.09 3.51
External dependence is defined as capital expenditures (Compustat # 128) minus cash flow 
from operations divided by capital expenditures. Cash flow from operations is broadly defined 
as the sum of Compustat funds from operations(items # 110), decreases in inventories,
decreases in receivables, and increases in payables.
Source:  Rajan and Zingales (1998)
 Table 2: Financial Development and Structure Across Countries
Summary Statistics
Finance-Activity Finance-Size Finance-Aggregate Finance-Dummy Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate Structure-Dummy
Mean 4.41 4.07 0.00 0.40 -2.84 -0.99 0.00 0.50
Median 4.85 4.26 0.13 0.00 -2.55 -1.00 0.01 0.50
Standard Deviation 2.62 0.77 1.00 0.50 1.67 0.89 1.00 0.51
Maximum 8.80 5.38 1.73 1.00 -0.76 0.88 1.46 1.00
Minimum -1.45 2.70 -2.06 0.00 -6.73 -2.80 -2.30 0.00
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Correlations




Finance-Aggregate 0.97 0.97 1
(0.001) (0.001)
Finance-Dummy 0.71 0.70 0.72 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Structure-Activity 0.89 0.65 0.79 0.50 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Structure-Size 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.14 0.67 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.386) (0.001)
Structure-Aggregate 0.77 0.61 0.71 0.35 0.91 0.91 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001)
Structure-Dummy 0.60 0.45 0.54 0.34 0.76 0.79 0.85 1
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
p-values are reported in parentheses
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size
Finance-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 0 if total value traded as share of GDP and claims on private sector by financial intermediaries as share of GDP are less than the respective sample mean, 1 otherwise
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size
Structure-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if Structure-Aggregate is above the median, 0 otherwiseTable 3: Industry Growth Across Countries
Summary Statistics
Industry's real growth Industry's growth in Industry's growth in 
number of firms average size of firms
Mean 3.34 1.41 2.16
Median 2.89 0.83 2.57
Standard Deviation 9.84 8.02 9.88
Maximum 100.00 94.37 41.03
Minimum -44.74 -41.42 -93.06
Observations 1258 1111 1051
Correlations
Industry's real growth Industry's growth in Industry's growth in 
number of firms average size of firms
Industry's real growth 1
Industry's growth in 0.38 1
number of firms (0.001)
Industry's growth in 0.71 -0.42 1
average size of firms (0.001) (0.001)
Industry's real growth = annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90.
Industry's growth in number of firms = log-difference between number of establishments in 1990 and 1980
Industry's growth in average size of firms = log-difference between industry's value added divided by number of establishments in 1990 and 1980Table 4: Financial Development and Industry Growth
OLS Regressions
Finance-Activity Finance-Size Finance-Aggregate Finance-Dummy
Interaction (external dependence  1.553
x Finance-Activity) (0.001)
Interaction (external dependence  4.431
x Finance-Size) (0.001)
Interaction (external dependence  3.866
x Finance-Aggregate ) (0.001)
Interaction (external dependence  4.499
x Finance-Dummy ) (0.001)
R
2 0.281 0.275 0.279 0.266
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222 1222
Differential in real growth rate 2.265 2.169 2.506 1.656
TSLS Regressions
Finance-Activity Finance-Size Finance-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  0.790
x Finance-Activity) (0.048)
Interaction (external dependence  2.816
x Finance-Size) (0.057)
Interaction (external dependence  2.075
x Finance-Aggregate ) (0.052)
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222
Differential in real growth rate 1.152 1.378 1.345
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country. 
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. The differential in real growth rate indicates 
how much faster an industry at the 75th percentile of external dependence grows with respect to an industry at the 25th percentile level
in a country at the 75th percentile of the respective measure of financial development compared to a country at the 25th percentile.
We use the British, French and German legal origin dummies as instruments for financial development in the TSLS regressions.
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size
Finance-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 0 if total value traded as share of GDP and claims on private sector 
                             by financial intermediaries as share of GDP are less than the respective sample mean, 1 otherwiseTable 5: Financial Structure and Industry Growth
OLS Regressions
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate Structure-Dummy
Interaction (external dependence  2.251
x Structure-Activity) (0.001)
Interaction (external dependence  2.618
x Structure-Size) (0.008)
Interaction (external dependence  3.365
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.001)
Interaction (external dependence  4.842
x Structure-Dummy ) (0.001)
R
2 0.278 0.266 0.274 0.267
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222 1222
TSLS Regressions
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  0.987
x Structure-Activity) (0.284)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.167
x Structure-Size) (0.325)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.380
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.855)
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country. 
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. We use the British, French and German legal 
origin dummies as instruments for financial structure in the TSLS regressions.
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size
Structure-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if Structure-Aggregate is above the median, 0 otherwiseTable 6:  Financial Development, Financial Structure, and Industry Growth
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -4.599
x Structure-Activity) (0.105)
Interaction (external dependence  -1.376
x Structure-Size) (0.210)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.113
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.167)
Interaction (external dependence  3.375 1.114 1.476
x Finance-Activity) (0.008) (0.032) (0.005)
 
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -4.437
x Structure-Activity) (0.163)
Interaction (external dependence  -1.758
x Structure-Size) (0.129)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.792
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.113)
Interaction (external dependence  11.842 4.438 6.172
x Finance-Size) (0.021) (0.015) (0.001)
 
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -4.841
x Structure-Activity) (0.118)
Interaction (external dependence  -1.562
x Structure-Size) (0.163)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.460
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.131)
Interaction (external dependence  9.254 3.090 4.213
x Finance-Aggregate) (0.012) (0.022) (0.002)
 
Number of observations 1222 1222 1222
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country. 
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. All regressions are TSLS. We use the British, 
French and German legal origin dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant population in total population  as 
instruments for financial development and financial structure.
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-SizeTable 7:  Financial Structure, the Legal Environment, and Industry Growth
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -0.153
x Structure-Activity) (0.866)
Interaction (external dependence  0.356
x Structure-Size) (0.803)
Interaction (external dependence  0.051
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.974)
Interaction (external dependence  0.177 0.205 0.185
x Creditor) (0.749) (0.715) (0.736)
Interaction (external dependence  0.014 -0.300 -0.100
x Anti-Director) (0.986) (0.801) (0.928)
Interaction (external dependence  0.959 0.875 0.900
x Rule of Law) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F-test Creditor, Anti-Director and 4.37 5.70 5.66
Rule of Law (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 1104 1104 1104
The dependent variable is the annual compounded growth rate in real value added for 1980-90 for each industry in each country. 
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. All regressions are TSLS. We use the British,
French and German legal origin dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant population in total population as 
instruments for financial structure and the legal determinants.
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size
Creditor = index of secured creditor rights
Anti-director = index of minority shareholder rights
Rule of Law = Measure of the law and order tradition of a country.Table 8:  Financial Development, Financial Structure, and the Growth in Number of Firms
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -0.765
x Structure-Activity) (0.604)
Interaction (external dependence  0.260
x Structure-Size) (0.760)
Interaction (external dependence  0.140
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.897)
Interaction (external dependence  1.448 0.982 0.987
x Finance-Activity) (0.084) (0.001) (0.013)
 
Number of observations 1082 1082 1082
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -0.907
x Structure-Activity) (0.505)
Interaction (external dependence  0.107
x Structure-Size) (0.903)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.094
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.932)
Interaction (external dependence  5.631 3.775 3.945
x Finance-Size) (0.041) (0.001) (0.007)
 
Number of observations 1082 1082 1082
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -0.929
x Structure-Activity) (0.513)
Interaction (external dependence  0.181
x Structure-Size) (0.833)
Interaction (external dependence  0.011
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.992)
Interaction (external dependence  4.105 2.676 2.753
x Finance-Aggregate) (0.052) (0.001) (0.009)
 
Number of observations 1082 1082 1082
The dependent variable is the log difference between the number of establishments in 1990 and 1980 for each industry in each country. 
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. All regressions are TSLS. We use the British, 
French and German legal origin dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant population in total population  as 
instruments for financial development and financial structure.
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-SizeTable 9:  Financial Development, Financial Structure, and the Growth in Average Size of Firms
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -2.514
x Structure-Activity) (0.191)
Interaction (external dependence  -1.638
x Structure-Size) (0.067)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.106
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.075)
Interaction (external dependence  1.714 0.636 0.949
x Finance-Activity) (0.066) (0.068) (0.016)
 
Number of observations 1051 1051 1051
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -1.556
x Structure-Activity) (0.399)
Interaction (external dependence  -1.682
x Structure-Size) (0.064)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.063
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.096)
Interaction (external dependence  4.257 2.329 3.366
x Finance-Size) (0.182) (0.058) (0.017)
 
Number of observations 1051 1051 1051
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -2.048
x Structure-Activity) (0.285)
Interaction (external dependence  -1.663
x Structure-Size) (0.065)
Interaction (external dependence  -2.104
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.081)
Interaction (external dependence  3.833 1.693 2.499
x Finance-Aggregate) (0.115) (0.062) (0.016)
 
Number of observations 1051 1051 1051
The dependent variable is the log difference between the average size of establishments in 1990 and 1980 for each industry in each country. 
The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's 
share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. All regressions are TSLS. We use the British, 
French and German legal origin dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and Protestant population in total population as 
instruments for financial development and financial structure.
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-SizeTable 10:  Financial Structure, the Legal Environment, and the Sources of Industry Growth
Growth of the Number of Firms
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  0.547
x Structure-Activity) (0.489)
Interaction (external dependence  0.505
x Structure-Size) (0.661)
Interaction (external dependence  0.888
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.498)
Interaction (external dependence  0.750 0.750 0.755
x Creditor) (0.136) (0.137) (0.133)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.268 -0.279 -0.467
x Anti-Director) (0.726) (0.760) (0.630)
Interaction (external dependence  0.429 0.552 0.452
x Rule of Law) (0.117) (0.003) (0.059)
F-test Creditor, Anti-Director and 1.81 4.04 2.83
Rule of Law (0.144) (0.007) (0.038)
Number of observations 997 997 997
Growth of the Average Size of Firms
Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate
Interaction (external dependence  -0.164
x Structure-Activity) (0.854)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.584
x Structure-Size) (0.651)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.520
x Structure-Aggregate ) (0.725)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.575 -0.584 -0.581
x Creditor) (0.275) (0.271) (0.270)
Interaction (external dependence  -0.532 -0.278 -0.338
x Anti-Director) (0.471) (0.787) (0.728)
Interaction (external dependence  0.372 0.377 0.406
x Rule of Law) (0.253) (0.106) (0.164)
F-test Creditor, Anti-Director and 2.06 1.84 2.16
Rule of Law (0.104) (0.139) (0.091)
Number of observations 970 970 970
The dependent variable is the log difference in the number of establishment (average size of establishments) between 1990 and 1980 
in the top panel (bottom panel) for each industry in each country. The p-values for heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. All regressions also include the industry's share of total value added in manufacturing in 1980 and country and industry dummies. 
All regressions are TSLS. We use the British, French and German legal origin dummies and the share of Catholic, Muslim and 
Protestant population in total population as instruments for financial structure and the legal determinants.
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size
Creditor = index of secured creditor rights
Anti-director = index of minority shareholder rights
Rule of Law = Measure of the law and order tradition of a country.Table A1: Financial Development, Financial Structure and the Legal Environment Across Countries
Country Finance-Activity Finance-Size Finance-Aggregate Finance-Dummy Structure-Activity Structure-Size Structure-Aggregate Structure-Dummy Creditor Anti-director Rule of Law
Australia 6.76 4.77 0.92 1 -1.19 0.05 1.18 1 1 4 10
Austria 5.23 4.48 0.43 1 -3.55 -2.80 -1.35 0 3 2 10
Bangladesh -1.45 2.70 -2.06 0 -6.73 -2.66 -2.30 0
Belgium 4.34 3.87 -0.15 0 -2.27 -0.27 0.63 1 2 0 10
Brazil 4.72 3.49 -0.32 0 -0.98 -0.30 1.03 1 1 3 6.32
Canada 6.77 4.76 0.92 1 -1.35 -0.06 1.06 1 1 5 10
Chile 4.23 4.24 0.08 0 -3.46 -0.75 -0.06 0 2 5 7.02
Colombia 1.95 3.34 -0.97 0 -3.86 -1.47 -0.63 0 0 3 2.08
Costa Rica -0.91 3.13 -1.66 0 -6.65 -1.34 -1.46 0
Denmark 4.70 4.09 0.07 0 -2.80 -0.90 0.07 1 3 2 10
Egypt 1.70 3.46 -0.93 0 -4.82 -1.85 -1.18 0 4 2 4.17
Finland 4.99 4.28 0.25 1 -3.10 -1.33 -0.30 0 1 3 10
France 6.01 4.65 0.69 1 -2.83 -1.73 -0.45 0 0 3 8.98
Germany 7.26 4.67 0.95 1 -1.64 -1.59 0.02 1 3 1 9.23
Greece 2.59 3.92 -0.46 0 -4.47 -1.62 -0.92 0 1 2 6.18
India 4.48 3.51 -0.36 0 -2.04 -1.53 -0.07 0 4 5 4.17
Israel 6.37 4.30 0.53 1 -1.32 -0.56 0.76 1 4 3 4.82
Italy 5.01 4.09 0.13 0 -2.79 -1.57 -0.34 0 2 1 8.33
Japan 8.80 5.38 1.73 1 -0.77 -0.35 1.07 1 2 4 8.98
Jordan 5.85 4.66 0.67 0 -2.21 -0.14 0.73 1 1 4.35
Korea 6.90 4.40 0.70 1 -1.04 -1.03 0.57 1 3 2 10
Malaysia 6.55 4.87 0.95 1 -1.68 0.11 1.05 1 4 4 6.78
Mexico 3.50 2.81 -1.02 0 -1.27 -0.81 0.62 1 0 1 5.35
Morocco 0.65 3.13 -1.36 0 -5.19 -2.15 -1.49 0
Netherlands 7.31 4.99 1.18 1 -1.65 -0.75 0.54 1 2 2 10
New Zealand 5.34 4.37 0.38 0 -1.39 0.62 1.46 1 3 4 10
Nigeria -1.12 3.05 -1.76 0 -6.68 -1.41 -1.52 0 4 3 2.73
Norway 5.75 4.56 0.59 0 -2.44 -1.38 -0.11 0 2 4 10
Pakistan 2.59 3.34 -0.84 0 -3.75 -1.70 -0.73 0 4 5 3.03
Peru 1.40 2.70 -1.50 0 -2.84 -0.46 0.32 1 0 3 2.5
Philippines 4.09 3.64 -0.35 0 -2.49 -1.17 0.00 0 0 3 2.73
Portugal 4.23 4.31 0.12 1 -4.26 -2.66 -1.49 0 1 3 8.68
Singapore 7.82 5.35 1.51 1 -1.10 0.39 1.42 1 4 4 8.57
South Africa 6.03 5.23 1.08 0 -2.09 0.88 1.39 1 3 5 4.42
Spain 5.71 4.43 0.49 1 -2.71 -1.55 -0.30 0 2 4 7.8
Sri Lanka 0.74 3.23 -1.28 0 -5.09 -0.97 -0.73 0 3 3 6.25
Sweden 6.68 4.83 0.94 1 -1.60 -0.30 0.83 1 2 3 10
Turkey 0.98 2.83 -1.50 0 -4.40 -2.10 -1.19 0 2 2 5
UK 7.14 4.72 0.96 1 -0.76 0.15 1.38 1 4 5 8.57
US 8.11 5.15 1.44 1 -0.86 -0.24 1.10 1 1 5 10
Venezuela 2.51 4.02 -0.41 0 -4.65 -1.61 -0.98 0 1 6.37
Zimbabwe 2.86 3.32 -0.80 0 -2.60 -0.47 0.40 1 4 3 3.68
Finance-Activity = log(Total value traded as share of GDP * Claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Size = log(Market capitalization and claims on private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP)
Finance-Aggregate = First principal component of Finance-Activity and Finance-Size
Finance-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 0 if total value traded as share of GDP and claims on private sector by financial intermediaries as share of GDP are less than the respective sample mean, 0 otherwise
                             
Structure-Activity = log(Total value traded divided by claims on private sector by commercials banks)
Structure-Size = log(Market capitalization divided by claims on private sector by commercials bank)
Structure-Aggregate = First principal components of Structure-Activity and Structure-Size
Structure-Dummy = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if Structure-Aggregate is above the median, 0 otherwise
Creditor = index of secured creditor rights
Anti-director = index of minority shareholder rights
Rule of Law = Measure of the law and order tradition of a country.
 Table A2: Country Classification of Financial Structure
Country Structure-Activity Country Structure-Size Country Structure-Aggregate Country Structure-Dummy
UK -0.76 South Africa 0.88 New Zealand 1.46 Australia 1
Japan -0.77 New Zealand 0.62 Singapore 1.42 Belgium 1
US -0.86 Singapore 0.39 South Africa 1.39 Brazil 1
Brazil -0.98 UK 0.15 UK 1.38 Canada 1
Korea -1.04 Malaysia 0.11 Australia 1.18 Denmark 1
Singapore -1.10 Australia 0.05 US 1.10 Germany 1
Australia -1.19 Canada -0.06 Japan 1.07 Israel 1
Mexico -1.27 Jordan -0.14 Canada 1.06 Japan 1
Israel -1.32 US -0.24 Malaysia 1.05 Jordan 1
Canada -1.35 Belgium -0.27 Brazil 1.03 Korea 1
New Zealand -1.39 Sweden -0.30 Sweden 0.83 Malaysia 1
Sweden -1.60 Brazil -0.30 Israel 0.76 Mexico 1
Germany -1.64 Japan -0.35 Jordan 0.73 Netherlands 1
Netherlands -1.65 Peru -0.46 Belgium 0.63 New Zealand 1
Malaysia -1.68 Zimbabwe -0.47 Mexico 0.62 Peru 1
India -2.04 Israel -0.56 Korea 0.57 Singapore 1
South Africa -2.09 Netherlands -0.75 Netherlands 0.54 South Africa 1
Jordan -2.21 Chile -0.75 Zimbabwe 0.40 Sweden 1
Belgium -2.27 Mexico -0.81 Peru 0.32 UK 1
Norway -2.44 Denmark -0.90 Denmark 0.07 US 1
Philippines -2.49 Sri Lanka -0.97 Germany 0.02 Zimbabwe 1
Zimbabwe -2.60 Korea -1.03 Philippines 0.00 Austria 0
Spain -2.71 Philippines -1.17 Chile -0.06 Banglades 0
Italy -2.79 Finland -1.33 India -0.07 Chile 0
Denmark -2.80 Costa Rica -1.34 Norway -0.11 Colombia 0
France -2.83 Norway -1.38 Finland -0.30 Costa Rica 0
Peru -2.84 Nigeria -1.41 Spain -0.30 Egypt 0
Finland -3.10 Colombia -1.47 Italy -0.34 Finland 0
Chile -3.46 India -1.53 France -0.45 France 0
Austria -3.55 Spain -1.55 Colombia -0.63 Greece 0
Pakistan -3.75 Italy -1.57 Sri Lanka -0.73 India 0
Colombia -3.86 Germany -1.59 Pakistan -0.73 Italy 0
Portugal -4.26 Venezuela -1.61 Greece -0.92 Morocco 0
Turkey -4.40 Greece -1.62 Venezuela -0.98 Nigeria 0
Greece -4.47 Pakistan -1.70 Egypt -1.18 Norway 0
Venezuela -4.65 France -1.73 Turkey -1.19 Pakistan 0
Egypt -4.82 Egypt -1.85 Austria -1.35 Philippines 0
Sri Lanka -5.09 Turkey -2.10 Costa Rica -1.46 Portugal 0
Morocco -5.19 Morocco -2.15 Morocco -1.49 Spain 0
Costa Rica -6.65 Portugal -2.66 Portugal -1.49 Sri Lanka 0
Nigeria -6.68 Banglades -2.66 Nigeria -1.52 Turkey 0
Banglades -6.73 Austria -2.80 Banglades -2.30 Venezuela 0